For years, experts have racked their brains over how to bring the European Union (E.U.) closer to its citizens, focusing on the European Citizens’ Initiative, the Conference on the Future of Europe, and institutional reform. The European Commission is notoriously famous for its technocratic reputation (Tudzarovska, 2025), and a key criticism is that the President of the Commission and the College of Commissioners are not nominated by the European Parliament, thereby calling into question their democratic legitimacy. On November 22, 2023, Parliament presented its proposals to amend the Treaties and suggested institutional reforms to reverse the roles of the Council and the Parliament in the nomination and confirmation of the President of the European Commission. The proposal would reflect the results of the European elections and institutionalize a lead candidate process (Spitzenkandidaten) as a basis for the nomination of the Commission President. Parliament would vote on the President by majority and, afterwards, obtain the consent of the European Council acting by qualified majority. The President-elect would then propose a list of candidates for appointment as members of the Commission, which would be renamed the Executive. The hope is that this process would align the Union’s political procedures more closely with national practices and be more easily understood by the public while reducing the influence of intergovernmental negotiations in the European Council and providing greater democratic legitimacy to the office of the Commission President.

European Union flags flutter as people take part in the demonstration “One Europe for all”, a rally against nationalism across the European Union, in Vienna, Austria, May 19, 2019.

But will the proposed politicization of the Commission fulfill the democratic objective? Probably not. Recently, the right-wing Romanian Member of the European Parliament, Gheorghe Piperea, initiated a vote of no confidence against the current Commission. Piperea belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. Its members include the ultra-right Fratelli d’Italia party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, the national-conservative PiS party from Poland, the party of the far-right French politician Eric Zemmour, and the far-right Spanish party Vox. Although the ECR group distanced itself from Piperea’s initiative, the move constitutes an excellent example of the dangers that come with a possible increased politicization of the Commission by furthering its attachment to the European Parliament instead of focusing on its key functions, among them safeguarding democracy and the rule of law in E.U. Member States.

Demonstration in favour of the European Union. Italy – January 2019. [Shutterstock/Mike Dotta]

According to Robert Dahl, a “democratic process must make effective participation and voting equality available to all adults who are subject to the binding collective decisions of society” (Coglianese, 1990). Whether these parameters should be applied to the Commission depends largely on its function and the corresponding line of accountability, which, in turn, grants legitimacy. Politically speaking, accountability requires an actor to adhere to specific standards, which external agents can assess (Fjørtoft & Sandven, 2023).  The standards the Commission has to fulfil, however, neither align with party politics nor do they match the political party accountability that we associate with nationally elected governments or the European Parliament. Rather, the Commission’s main task is to ensure the implementation of Union policies and institutional procedures stipulated by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009, TEU and TFEU), as agreed by the democratically elected governments of Member States. The suggested politicization counterfeits this purpose, misses established lines of accountability, and potentially results in a conflict of interest. It sacrifices the Commission’s ability to fulfill its core functions, put in place in the interest of citizens to keep national democracies intact.

The Lisbon Treaty has had a long and difficult birth (Photo: Portuguese EU Presidency)

Shifting from the Foundation?

The Treaty of Lisbon states that the Commission is bound by the “general interest of the Union” (Art. 17 TEU), dedicated to the promotion of peace, its values, the well-being of its people, and the functioning of the European single market (Art. 3 TEU). The Union’s values are enshrined in Article 2 TEU: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. In line with these aims, both the suggested reforms by Parliament and the current Treaties require that each Commissioners’ “independence is beyond doubt” (European Parliament, 2023). Already in 1952, in his speech at the inauguration of the ECSC High Authority in Luxembourg, Jean Monnet got right to the point: “We will perform our duties with complete independence in the general interest of the Community.” The Commission’s mandate is not politically flexible for a reason. With the establishment of the European Community for Steel and Coal (ECSC) in 1952, European institutions were created in the interest of the people to prevent the repetition of authoritarian rule and the misuse of national power.  Peace, liberty, solidarity, and the joint coordination of goods once used for war constituted the foundational, narrative core of the then-new supranational organization – and the Commission was to monitor the envisioned long-term peace project. The institution was established with a commitment to this objective, grounded in a liberal political tradition that continues through to the present-day Treaty of Lisbon.

Address given by Jean Monnet at the inaugural session of the ECSC Court of Justice (Luxembourg, 10 December 1952)

These treaties stand in contrast to political party agendas that advocate for the replacement of the E.U.’s supranational governance structure with a federation of fully sovereign states or for protectionist economic policies. (Alternative für Deutschland, 2024; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2024) Subjecting the Commission to party politics would undermine its core purpose, which is difficult to align with the extremist, protectionist, and nationalistic views the ECSC was intended to prevent.

The Commission is required to adhere to the liberal standards and the respective institutional framework that the Member States subjected themselves to through the Union treaties and in the interest of their citizens. The Commission is to deliver and monitor the respective policy implementation against the backdrop of these Union standards, not against the backdrop of party politics. Union treaty provisions remain the moment of assessment for the Commission’s legitimacy – a legitimacy that is derived from divergent functions of national governments and the supranational institutions of the Union.

Great Disappointments: The Commission as a Government?

As the Commission does not function as a government in the sense that national governments do, the proposed treaty reform to rename the Commission to the Executive is misleading. The term Executive evokes competency associations similar to national governments and ultimately creates unfulfillable expectations, which could result in public disappointment and the potential defeat of the democratic purpose of the treaty reform itself. When referring to a society’s binding collective decisions, we know that a national government has the capacity to impact the overall political direction. In the E.U., however, a change of the overall liberal direction of Union policies would not be determined by the Commission but by Member States via a treaty change initiated by the European Council, which provides “the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define [emphasis by the author] the general political directions and priorities thereof. […]” (Art. 15 TEU).  The Commission’s power is not constructed analogously to a national executive. Only once a particular area is collectively designated to the supranational level by the democratically elected heads of states and governments of the Union’s Member States, the Commission’s role is to promote (Art. 17, TEU) respective policies that were unanimously defined and delegated to the supranational level by national governments. While Member States have the governmental power of competency allocation through the development of Union treaties via primary law, the Commission wields significant power at the supranational level via secondary law, particularly through its legal initiative in the fields of exclusive Union competency (Art. 3 TFEU)[1], which is derived precisely from the accountability to the Union’s aims. Secondary law originates from an overall liberal political narrative and goal. But the Commission does not have the allocating power as such (Grimm, 2015). At max, we can speak of a shared executive. Yet, as the Commission can neither be held accountable for the overall direction of the Union, nor the preceding competency delegation the way national governments can, the Commission is far away from holding executive power as we know it from national contexts. Citizens are the “external agents” (Fjørtoft & Sandven, 2023) who must hold their governments accountable when dissatisfied with the binding collective decisions that result from fulfilling the function of policy definition for the Union. With that procedure in place, it is not the European Commission but the nationals of the Member States who have the first and the last say in defining the general political direction of the E.U.  Linking the Commission composition to the European elections, especially the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, might create the impression that the Commission’s task is not only policy promotion but policy definition. Its legitimacy would be tested against the wrong “specific standards” (Fjørtoft & Sandven, 2023).

Under the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the College of Commissioners has 6 Vice-Presidents and 20 Commissioners, reflectingthe ambitions set out in the Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 mandate of the European Commission.

The Wrong Label

Confusion about the E.U. exists. We currently know that knowledge about the E.U. correlates with approval for it. The lesser the knowledge about the E.U., the higher the skepticism towards it (van den Hoogen et. al., 2024). Ergo, the more uninformed the voter, the higher the likelihood of disappointment. Indeed, many citizens simply do not know which policies the E.U. can determine, and which ones are out of its reach. A few examples: In a 2023 Eurobarometer survey about citizenship and democracy, 87% of 25,722 respondents stated that they feel they are citizens of the E.U. while only 50% stated that they are sufficiently informed about their rights as E.U. citizens – clearly a lack of information regarding competency allocation and, subsequently, accountability lines. With the way European election campaigns are currently being undertaken, national policies often dominate the discourse, and the misconception of which standards are to be tested in a European election is aggravated (Griera, 2024).

We have seen national politicians blur competency distinctions as well. In Germany, Markus Söder’s (CDU) interpreted the European elections as a vote of no-confidence for Olaf Scholz (SPD). In France, Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly following the Renaissance Party’s disappointing outcome on the European level.  This conflation of accountability contributes to public confusion regarding institutional competencies and obstructs clear assessment of policy outcomes across different levels of governance.  Applying national terminology (Executive) to the European level may exacerbate this effect as it can lead to unrealistic policy expectations being directed at a level of governance lacking the corresponding competencies. Consequently, disappointments might follow with potential democratic backsliding in Member States through a Blame Brussels Culture, which could undermine the credibility of the Commission’s core functions.

Broadcast of Emmanuel Macron’s speech after the European elections results, in Paris, on June 9, 2024. JULIEN MUGUET FOR LE MONDE

Great Expectations: Safeguarding Democracy and the Rule of Law

The need for the Commission’s resilience to political trends comes with the need for E.U. Member States to remain functioning democracies. Only in democracies can citizens fulfill their assessment function through checking their respective government’s performance on the national and the supranational level. Only when functioning as democracies, Dahl’s requirement of equal voting rights for all adults in the Union’s Member States is ensured. The Commission is key in safeguarding democratic rule by protecting Member States from democratic backsliding, defined as the “deliberate, intended action designed to gradually undermine the fundamental rules of the game in an existing democracy, carried out by a democratically elected government” (Bakke & Sitter, 2022). In this role, the Commission ensures the functioning of national democratic systems in E.U. Member States by overseeing adherence to Article 2: As long as national democracies function, Union treaty reforms are democratically legitimized through the electorate in each Member State. Hence, for the Union to remain democratically legitimized, its Member States must remain functioning democracies. The Commission has a key role as a democracy watchdog. The Article 7 procedure (which stipulates that Member State’s rights can be suspended if they breach the EU’s Article 2 TEU values), infringement procedures, annual rule of law reports on each Member State, and the supervision of the conditionality of the Union budget as stipulated in regulation 2020/2092 and regulation 2021/1060 have proven to be important tools for the protection of democratic structures and the rule of law. But they faced their limits when confronted with Member States’ interests.

{Read: Germany at a Crossroads: Will It Rise Again as Europe’s Anchor? by: N. Nojumi}

Upholding Union Values in Poland and Hungary

The recently solved legal dispute with the Republic of Poland has shown precisely that. On December 20, 2017, the Article 7 procedure was started, potentially ending in sanctions against a Member State in the case of “a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2” (Art. 7 TEU). However, sanctions were never imposed because the Member States could not reach an agreement, highlighting the limitations of political calculus for the protection of the Article 2 values. In contrast, the Commission’s efforts to initiate infringement procedures have proved to be an enforcement mechanism of the Union’s principles (C-619/18, C-192/18, C-791/19, C-204/21), leading to a daily fine of €1 million on October 27, 2021, as the country failed to retract specific judicial reforms that contravened E.U. standards (C-204/21R).

In the case of Hungary, a similar reluctance of governments comes to the fore: a Parliament proposal to initiate an Article 7 procedure has remained pending at the General Affairs Council, and the Commission has been more hesitant with the implementation of the conditionality of the Union budget. Hoping to secure Hungary’s agreement to a multi-billion-euro E.U. aid package for Ukraine, it decided to release 10.2 billion euros in aid from the Social and Cohesion Funds to Hungary despite the country’s continuous breaches of Article 2 TEU. This prompted the European Parliament, with the support of Commission President von der Leyen’s European People’s Party, to file a lawsuit against the Commission at the European Court of Justice. This precedent for conditioning the retention of E.U. funds on the protection of the rule of law and fundamental rights within Member States underscores that adherence to the treaties, which determine its mandate—rather than political calculations—must guide the Commission’s actions if it is to maintain its legitimacy and credibility.

A Triangular Conflict of Interests

As the Commission navigates between its watchdog function and its fulfilment of Member States’ interests, politicizing the Commission could undermine the Commission’s function as guardian of the treaties even more. It could aggravate the conflict of interest between the endurance of political values and the short life of political trends, especially as political fragmentation within Member States, and subsequently in the European Parliament, increases (Sokolovskis, 2025). If the European Commission aligns itself politically with forces that diverge from the fundamental objectives of the E.U. treaties, it risks becoming entangled between partisan loyalties and its duty to uphold treaty obligations, in addition to the already existing need to balance the overarching aims of the treaties with the diverse interests of the Member States. The conflict of interests would point in three directions: party politics, Member State interests, and treaty goals. The latter, and thus the Commission’s mandated commitment to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, however, are key because democracy in the E.U. is not a one-way street. It is also shaped by the state of democracy within the Member States, which the Commission is tasked with monitoring. Further restricting the Commission’s accountability to the political majorities would weaken a vital safeguard of European democracy.