Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy: Strategic Realism or Doctrinal Exhaustion?
The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) issued under Donald Trump is less a roadmap for American power than a political artifact of an era marked by exhaustion, anxiety, and systemic transition. Drafted amid declining U.S. dominance, it abandons the confidence and forward-looking ambition of earlier strategies. Rather than articulating a vision for sustaining primacy, it seeks to manage relative decline—without confronting its underlying causes.
For the first time in modern U.S. strategic planning, domestic instability and external competition are collapsed into a single security framework. Immigration, border control, narcotics trafficking, crime, and social fragmentation are elevated to existential threats, while alliances, institutions, and long-standing global commitments—once force multipliers—are reframed as liabilities. The result is a reactionary doctrine that substitutes coercion for strategy at home and abroad, privileging short-term control over long-term strategic renewal.
The 2025 NSS is best understood as symptomatic: an expression of a United States struggling to reconcile internal decay with the irreversible emergence of a multipolar world. Its failure lies not in recognizing decline, but in mistaking securitization for renewal and coercion for adaptation—an error that risks accelerating the very decline it seeks to manage.
{Read: Great Expectations, Great Disappointments: Protecting the Mandate of the European Union. By B. Ebert}
The Securitization of Domestic Crisis
One of the defining features of the 2025 NSS is the unprecedented framing of domestic challenges as national security threats. Immigration, border control, narcotics, crime, and social unrest are no longer treated as governance or policy failures but as strategic vulnerabilities that weaken America’s global position.
This framing did not emerge in a vacuum. It reflects a society undergoing profound socio-economic stress. For a growing share of Americans—particularly younger generations—the promise of upward mobility has collapsed. Home ownership has become unattainable, healthcare costs are punitive, student debt is overwhelming, and wages lag far behind inflation. The American Dream, once a unifying myth, increasingly feels hollow.
Trump’s political appeal cannot be understood without recognizing this reality. Millions of voters who openly disliked his behavior nevertheless supported him out of economic anxiety and institutional distrust. The now-familiar sentiment— “I don’t like him, but I trust him more on the economy”—captures a collapse of confidence in political elites, technocratic governance, and media institutions.

Trump voters’ reasons for voting in the 2024 election – Source: PRRI – Post-election survey, Nov. 8, Dec. 2, 2024.
Trump positioned himself as an outsider willing to confront entrenched interests. Legal cases, impeachments, and investigations—regardless of their legitimacy—were interpreted by many voters not as accountability but as evidence that he threatened a discredited establishment. In this environment, moral failings were reframed as rough edges of a fighter.
The Democratic Party’s failure to articulate a compelling economic vision deepened this dynamic. By prioritizing social and cultural issues while neglecting material insecurity—housing, inflation, energy, and healthcare—Democratic leadership ceded the economic narrative. Trump filled that vacuum, not with solutions, but with symbolism and blame.

Harris voters’ reasons for voting in the 2024 election – Source: PRRI – Post-election survey, Nov. 8, Dec. 2, 2024.
The 2025 NSS channels this domestic anxiety into a security paradigm. Immigration is linked to crime. Crime is linked to sovereignty. Drug addiction is treated primarily through enforcement rather than public health. What the strategy avoids acknowledging is that these crises are structural—rooted in inequality, deindustrialization, governance failure, and political alienation.
“America First” and the Illusion of Strategic Clarity
The ideological anchor of the 2025 NSS is the “America First” doctrine. It emphasizes sovereignty over integration, transactions over partnerships, and short-term gains over systemic stability. Alliances are scrutinized for cost-benefit ratios; institutions are dismissed as constraints; values are subordinated to interests.
In theory, this approach aligns with realism; in practice, however, it reflects a narrow and incoherent application of realist thought that fails to account for the evolutionary dynamics of time and space while prioritizing national interests. Classical and offensive realism—articulated by thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and, more recently, John Mearsheimer—tend to understate the shared sacrifices and collective successes of nations that culminated in the establishment of international norms, institutions, and treaties designed to prevent a third world war, curb the spread of epidemics, mitigate global disasters, and reduce poverty. To be clear, these thinkers rightly emphasize the disciplined management of power to advance national interests over the long term. Yet viewing an emerging multipolar global order exclusively through the lens of one’s own national interest does not justify imposing those interests at the expense of others—particularly among major powers.
In contrast to these traditional realist perspectives, I characterize the contemporary global environment as a Post-Realist Era, offering a broader framework for U.S. strategic planners that reflects the realities of multipolarity in international relations. Such a framework would enable national security planners to recalibrate alliances, realign global institutions, and integrate strategic restraint with selective cooperation to secure American interests more effectively. This is what I define as a sustainable interpretation of “America First.” It does not require a return to the gloomy pre–World War II era; rather, it calls for building upon shared national interests, the contributions of global institutions, and the achievements of multilateral cooperation that advance national interests while strengthening stability and peaceful coexistence within an inherently chaotic global order. In this regard, an “America First” strategy cannot be sustained through a zero-sum approach that prioritizes the subjugation of others through brute force funded by American blood. Failing the emerging generation of Americans—who are increasingly deprived of the American Dream by extreme inequality, eroded political representation, and the looting of national resources through corporate greed and political corruption—is the antithesis of a truly “America First” agenda.
By contrast, the Trump NSS treats cooperation as weakness and elevates trade war and military firepower as strategy. This constricted strategic imagination coincides with a historic transformation of the global system—one that the NSS acknowledges rhetorically but fails to engage in any substantive way.
The Structural End of U.S. Economic Dominance
Perhaps the most consequential development shaping the 2025 NSS is the erosion of U.S. financial hegemony. By 2025, more than 90 percent—approximately $245 billion—of trade between China and Russia was settled in yuan and rubles, entirely outside the SWIFT system and U.S. banking oversight. This bypassed seven decades of American financial infrastructure.
The rise of the BRICS bloc is no longer speculative. Accounting for approximately 37 percent of global GDP, BRICS has surpassed the U.S.-led G7, whose share has fallen to around 30 percent—down sharply from 45 percent in 2010. This shift reflects more than economic growth; it reflects the maturation of alternative systems of trade, finance, and development.
China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), integrated with Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), now processes hundreds of thousands of transactions daily, involving over 1,500 financial institutions across more than 100 countries. This architecture reduces vulnerability to sanctions and weakens Washington’s most powerful coercive tool.
Sanctions Fatigue and the Rise of Parallel Finance
For over seven decades, U.S. power relied on control of global finance. Sanctions worked because access to New York and SWIFT was indispensable. That era is ending.
Countries targeted by U.S. sanctions—Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea, and Russia—now conduct substantial trade through non-dollar channels. Meanwhile, China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank have offered developing countries financing without political conditionality or austerity requirements.
Since 2013, alternative financial institutions have funded over $1 trillion in infrastructure projects—surpassing the World Bank’s reach. Unsurprisingly, the dollar’s share of global reserves has fallen from 71 percent in 1999 to 58 percent in 2024. Each percentage-point decline represents approximately $350 billion in reduced demand for U.S. Treasury bonds, which means that the total decline in 25 years passed $4.55 trillion.
This erosion directly undermines Washington’s ability to finance deficits, project power, and enforce compliance.
Europe’s Strategic Drift
The 2025 NSS marks a decisive break from the post-World War II transatlantic consensus. It criticizes the European Union on immigration, free speech, regulation, and defense spending, even warning of “civilizational erasure.” Stability with Russia is prioritized over European territorial integrity.

Vice President Vance delivers a blistering critique of European democratic practices, arguing that the greatest threat to the continent came from within, rather than from Russia or China. Munich Security Conference, February 14, 2025.
Rather than confront Washington openly, Europe has quietly diversified. Hundreds of European companies and financial institutions have integrated into China’s banking ecosystem. European participation in CIPS reached 261 institutions by 2025, facilitating around $800 billion in trade.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, July 24, 2025. REUTERS
This shift reflects necessity, not ideology. Energy shortages caused by the Ukraine war and the loss of Russian gas weakened Europe’s industrial competitiveness. German firms relocated to the U.S. for energy costs or to China for subsidies. Strategic autonomy became an economic imperative.
The result is growing divergence between European and American interests—particularly regarding China’s role in a multipolar system.
{Read: Germany at a Crossroads: Will It Rise Again as Europe’s Anchor? By N. Nojumi}
The Middle East and the End of the Petrodollar
The 2025 NSS downplays the Middle East while emphasizing stability and disengagement from “forever wars.” Yet one decision has reshaped global finance more than any other event: Saudi Arabia’s refusal to renew the informal petrodollar arrangement, which expired in June 2024.

Saudi Arabia now sells oil in multiple currencies, including yuan, euros, and yen. Combined with similar moves by the UAE, Qatar, and Iran, more than one-third of global oil reserves now operate outside exclusive dollar settlement.
Saudi Arabia’s $2.2 trillion sovereign wealth fund now operates within non-U.S. trading blocs. China purchases roughly $50 billion in Saudi oil annually through CIPS. By the end of 2025, over 30 percent of global payments—approximately $8 trillion in trade—bypassed U.S. financial systems entirely.
This marks a historic shift away from dollar-backed global energy markets.
The Global South’s Strategic Realignment
Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia are no longer peripheral to global power politics. China’s trade with Africa grew from $10 billion in 2000 to $282 billion in 2025—nearly five times its trade with the United States. Sixty-one African institutions are now integrated into CIPS.
Latin America’s trade with China reached $519 billion in 2024, supported by over $286 billion in Chinese investment across energy, minerals, agriculture, and infrastructure. Central Asia, once a logistical corridor for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, is now deeply embedded in the China–Russia security and economic framework.
CIPS now connects nearly 5,000 banking institutions across 190 countries.
Conclusion:
Strategic Realism Without Renewal Is Decline. The 2025 National Security Strategy is, in one respect, unusually candid. It acknowledges American fatigue, global fragmentation, and the definitive end of the post–Cold War unipolar moment. Its failure, however, lies not in diagnosis but in prescription. The strategy recognizes decline, yet offers control instead of renewal and coercion instead of adaptation.
By securitizing domestic dysfunction, the NSS externalizes structural failures rooted in the American political economy. Immigration, crime, and addiction are framed as security threats rather than as consequences of inequality, deindustrialization, institutional erosion, and governance failure. Reliance on force—at the border and increasingly within domestic space—has not restored cohesion or legitimacy; it has deepened resentment and weakened the social foundations of power.
Abroad, the strategy doubles down on tools that have already proven counterproductive. Decades of militarization hollowed out diplomacy, imposed immense fiscal and social costs, and accelerated the emergence of the multipolar order Washington now resists. Despite promises of restraint, continued reliance on coercive interventions reflects a narrow conception of statecraft in which force substitutes for strategy.
Most critically, the NSS accepts multipolarity while rejecting multilateralism. Withdrawal from international institutions is treated as efficiency, ignoring the reality that influence does not persist in the absence. As Washington vacates global forums, rivals—most notably Beijing—move to fill the void. Classical realism sought the dominance of national interests; the twenty-first century demands a post-realist approach grounded in restraint, engagement, and cooperation amid competition. The 2025 NSS does not make this transition.
America can reduce commitments, but it cannot reduce consequences. The strategy may accurately describe a changing world, yet if implemented as doctrine, it risks accelerating the decline it claims to manage. Without domestic renewal, institutional repair, and strategic humility, “America First” becomes not a doctrine of strength but a pathway to strategic isolation. In this sense, Trump’s 2025 NSS is not irrational—it is incomplete. Managing decline without renewal ultimately becomes indistinguishable from surrendering leadership altogether.


Well said, Neamat.
Thanks, Prof. Babbitt. We are charting into an unknown arena of international relations that demands an honest reorientation of the US role. In this piece, I tried to do my part and I hope it can provoke a more constructive debate to assist the atonement of the USNSS to a fast changing global order.